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Farm Risk Management Between Normal Business Risk and 
Climatic/Market Shocks 






Farm  risk  management  for  income  stabilization  is  on-going  issue.  An  applied  work  has  been 
performed to measure farm risk using a stochastic model. Risk management tools, with symmetric as 
well as asymmetric impacts, are then tested and compared through ad hoc statistics. Normal farm 
business  risk  can  be  efficiently  managed  using  a  precautionary  saving  provision.  Farm  revenue 
insurance is found as the most efficient asymmetric tool for dealing with climatic and market shocks. 





La gestion du risque agricole afin de stabiliser le revenu est un sujet permanent d’analyse. Un modèle 
stochastique a été réalisé afin de mesurer le risque agricole. Des outils de gestion du risque, avec une 
démarche de gestion symétrique et asymétrique, ont été modélisés afin d’estimer leur impact et de 
comparer leur performance. Ainsi, le risque normal peut-il être géré efficacement par une épargne de 
précaution.  L’assurance  chiffre  d’affaires  de  l’exploitation  agricole  peut  être  considérée  comme 
l’outil le plus performant pour la gestion de chocs climatiques et de marché. La liaison entre ces deux 
outils peut alors être ajustée en fonction de l’environnement de marché.   
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Agricultural specific risk is related to climatic, sanitary, market and environmental causes. 
Such risk may be normal but also catastrophic. It affects farm competitiveness through sub-
optimal production and investment choices (Anderson et Danthine 1980, Gollier 2007). It is 
therefore a private as well as political issue that is increasingly rising with changes in the 
European Common Agricultural Policy (Meuvissen et al. 1999, Cafiero et al. 2005, 2007). 
However,  most  studies  are  qualitative  (OECD  2000,  Alizadeh  et  al.  2005,  European 
Commission 2005). Few studies have been performed for quantifying the agricultural risk and 
analyze comparative performance of well-known tools currently offered or not by the market. 
Research was therefore required on individual tool performance for revenue risk management 
and optimal tool coordination, basically between precautionary saving fund - a symmetric risk 
management approach - and risk selling tools considered - an asymmetric approach. 
  The aim of the paper is to compare the performance of risk management tools on farm 
income.  It  presents  first  a  general  model  for  quantifying  agricultural  risk  designed  for 
analyzing various types of farm within different market environment and agricultural policies. 
The model, applied to the segment of French grain farm (wheat, corn, barley and rapeseed), is 
then used for simulating asymmetric risk management tools and then compare their impact in 
terms of pertinent statistics (mainly coefficient of variation and Value at Risk). The paper is   3 
then  presenting  a  tentative  optimal  use  of  the  most  efficient  tool  for  asymmetric  risk 
management with the smoothing tool, the precautionary saving provision.   
    
    
1. The stochastic model of farm income 
 
  The stochastic model is designed for eliciting the farm income distribution function using 
a Monte Carlo simulation. The impact of risk management tools is analyzed through their 
impact on the farm income distribution function. All simulations have been performed using 
the software @RISK (Palisade 1997, 2006). 
1.1. The deterministic model 
The grain farm income (FIt) is computed as the following: 
 
FIt = Σ Si,t.(Pi,t.ri,t + SFPi,t – VCi,t.ri,t) – FCt 
 
with:  Pi,t the average price for product i and year t 
    ri,t the agricultural yield for product i and year t 
    Si,t the acreage for product i and year t 
    VCi,t the variable costs per acre for product i at year t 
    SFPi,t the single farm payment per acre for product i at year t  
FCt the farm fixed costs at year t 
   
 
A representative farm in the Northern part of France is used to parameter the deterministic 
model. The farm is 230 hectares, with 54 % of wheat, 17 % of barley, 5 % of corn, 8 % of 
peas, 16 % of rapeseed, 0 % of sugar beet et 1 % of set-aside (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Deterministic model of farm income - Northern France average farm 






Revenue  Revenue  Variable  Variable 
costs 
Gross 








Total (€)  /ha (€)  Total (€)  / ha (€)  Total (€)  Costs/ ha (€)  Total (€)  Margin (€) 
Wheat  124  8.5  125  1063  131,750  400  49,600  1,463  181,350  333  41,292  140,058 
Barley  38  7.1  117  834  31,698  400  15,200  1,234  46,898  305  11,590  35,308 
Corn  11  8.7  85  743  8,178  400  4,400  1,143  12,578  350  3,850  8,728 
Peas  18  4.9  120  584  10,509  460  8,280  1,044  18,789  283  5,094  13,695 
Rapeseed  37  3.9  210  814  30,119  400  14,800  1,214  44,919  330  12,210  32,709 
Sugar 
beet 
0  73  35  2555  0    0  0  0  862  0  0 
Set aside  2          400  800  800  800  61  122  678 
                         
Total  230        212,254    93,080  305,334      74,158  231,176 
                         
                  Fixed costs (€) :    170,709 
                  Farm income (€) :    60,467 
                         
                  Résultat / ha (€) :    262.9 
 
 
1.2. The stochastic model with parameterization 
 
It  is  considered  that  climatic  and  market  risks  are  affecting  farm  income  through  the 
individual  yield  and  price  distribution  functions  of  each  production.  The  costs  are   4 
deterministic. More precisely, it is not considered any risk on the energy market. Correlations 
between yields and prices and cross-correlations between crops are parameterized, designing 
natural  farm  product  diversification.  Finally  basis  risk  is  not  considered  as  it  should  be 
marginal with respect to the market risk and therefore the revenue risk. 
 
Historical French or European prices are meaningless for estimating any price distribution 
as they reflect more a public policy than a market behavior. Therefore, distribution functions 
have been chosen upon price time series on various countries throughout the world. Crop 
prices were found in FAO statistics for sixteen years. Two sets of prices have been set. The 
first one – scenario 1 - is based upon 2006 price levels as available in published statistics. The 
second one – scenario 2 - has been created for simulating a « general » price level which 
creates the same income level without the direct payment per hectare from the 2003-2013 
CAP.  The  standard  deviation  is  considered  constant  in  percentage  of  the  mean.  Table  2 
presents the two sets of prices. 
 











deviation  Mean (€)  Standard 
deviation 




Wheat  Normal  125  21.6  183  31.1  17 % 
Barley  Normal  117  20.1  161  27.3  17 % 
Corn  Normal  85  12.7  120  18.0  15 % 
Rapeseed  Normal  210  31.5  294  44.1  15 % 
 
Normal distributions are stationary and symmetric
1. The price  risk as reflected by the 
percentage of standard deviation in relation to the mean value has been set in relation with 
international prices (Price STAT from FAOSTAT- http://faostat.fao.org). 
 
Using  French statistics, the crop  yields  are following beta distributions, as presented in 
Table 3. 
 
  Table 3 : Main crop yield distributions in France 
  Parameters 
 
Distribution 
α1  α2  Minimum  Maximum 
Mean   Standard 
deviation  Skewness  Kurtosis 
Wheat  Beta  7.0  2.8  3.5  10.5  8.55  0.96  -0.53  2.92 
Barley  Beta  3.7  2.4  4.4  8.9  7.10  0.82  -0.29  2.45 
Corn  Beta  3.2  1.5  6.5  9.8  8.75  0.64  -0.55  2.62 
Peas  Beta  2.9  2.0  3.8  5.6  4.90  0.36  -0.26  2.30 
Rapeseed  Beta  5.3  2.3  2.9  4.3  3.89  0.22  -0.52  2.81 
SugarBeet.  Beta  3.0  2.0  67  77  73.0  2.00  -0.29  2.30 
 
The beta distributions are stationary and asymmetric. The computed values of skewness 
for the main crops are negative, meaning that yield may increase slightly from the mode but it 
may  decrease  strongly.  In  addition,  individual  yield  variability  may  be  much  higher  than 
national yield variability for local climatic problems (hail, water excess or deficit at specific 
dates  in  relation  with  plant  development).  The  total  annual  indemnity  of  such  farmers  is 
                                                 
1 Lognormal and LogLogistic distributions have also been estimated against data. These alternative estimations 
do not bring any significative impact differences on farm income distribution.   5 
inducing a premium rate on multiple peril crop insurance in France. Data on French crop 
yields  have  been  provided  by  FAOSTAT  and  individual  risk  coefficients  come  from 
insurance experts. 
 
Parameterisation of cross-correlations within the farm portfolio 
 
Correlations and cross-correlations between variables should be set within the model. The 
more the products are substitutes, the higher is the positive correlation between prices (and 
reciprocally).  In  addition,  independent  and  local  markets  bring  high  negative  correlation 
between prices and yield. Reciprocally, international markets tend to lower the correlation 
between price and yield.  
 
 
Two extreme scenarios have been designed. The first one is set upon the hypothesis of a 
« close » European market, i.e. with measures of isolation such as flexible levies. Under this 
hypothesis, the negative correlation coefficients price/yield are high (Table 4). The second 
scenario is considering an open international European market where prices have no or low 
correlation with national yields (Table 5).  
 





















1                      
White 
price 
-0.5  1                   
Barley 
yield 
0.8  -0.4  1                
Barley 
price 
-0.5  0.8  -0.5  1             
Corn   
yield 
0.5  -0.2  0.5  -0.2  1          
 Corn  
price 
-0.4  0.8  -0.2  0.5  -0.5  1       
Rapeseed 
yield 
0.4  -0.2  0.1  -0.3  0.3  0.1  1    
Rapeseed 
price 
-0.4  0.2  -0.3  0.4  -0.4  0.4  -0.4  1 
 


















Wheat yield  1                      
Wheat price  0  1                   
Barley yield  0.8  0  1                
Barley price  0  0.8  0  1             
Corn yield  0.5  0  0.4  0  1          
Corn price  0  0.8  0  0.7  -0.2  1       
Rapeseed 
yield 
0.4  0  0.2  0  0.1  0  1    
Rapeseed 
price 
0  0.2  0  0.2  0  0.2  0  1   6 
 
 
2.  Farm risk measurement 
 
In fine, we consider farm risk as the distribution estimated function of income, as a margin 
before private payment to the farmer. The distribution function presents statistics such as 
mean, mode, median, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis which describe the ultimate 
farmer risk. In addition, percentiles of probability scales (from 5 to 95 %) indicates income 
values that are of interest for the farmer with respect to financial targets of risk management 
strategies. These percentiles are also called Values at Risk of the portfolio farm under risk 
management strategies.  
 
  For  instance,  the  farm  risk  for  the  representative  French  farm,  with  decoupled  direct 
payments and high negative price-yield correlation values is illustrated in figures 1 and 2. The 
estimated margin distribution has been set by Monte Carlo simulation using 5.000 random 
samples. Adjustments of distribution functions have been performed from data distributions 
using the chi-square method.  
 
Figure  1:  Distribution  of  farm  income  with  2006  prices,  with  direct  payments  and  high 
correlation values 
 Distribution pour Marge -situation 2006
Moyenne =59009,89





























Figure 2: Cumulative distribution of farm income with 2006 prices, with direct payments and 
high correlation values 
 Distribution cumulée marge - situation 2006
Moyenne =59009,89















The main characteristics of the farm risk (main crops in the northern part of France) are 
then presented in table 6. 
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Table 6: Characteristic of the farm risk  
 
 
Distribution  Mean   Standard 
deviation 
Coeff of 




margin    59,009  26,927 
 




margin  Normal  59,010  26,927 
 




To  elicit  risk  assessment,  the  characteristics  of  farm  risk  under  three  different 
environment scenarios are presented in Table 7. The coefficients of variation are strongly 
increasing from 0.46 to 0.67, a 46% increase when single farm payments (SFP) are balanced 
by an equivalent price increase. Conversely, the impact of single farm payments on a pure 
market basis is a 30% risk decrease as measured by the coefficient of variation. 
 
Table 7: Farm margin risk under market environments 
 
Farm Margin 
Distrib.  Moyenne   Ecart 
type 
Coeff. 
variation  Asym.  Aplat. 
 
VaR5% 












« closed » market without SFP   Normal  58,790  39,195  0.67  0.12  3.02  - 4,679 
« open » market with SFP  Normal  59,865  35,163  0.59  0.15  3.03   3,269 
« open » market without SFP  Normal  59,912  50,634 
 






3.  The risk management tools 
 
The  tools  considered  for  analysis  are  first  the  precautionary  saving  provision  for 
symmetric risk management and an insurance contract on farm revenue for asymmetric risk 
management. The insurance contract on farm revenue (or farm total sales) is conceptual as it 
does  not  exist  around  the  world.  It  is  known  that  this  insurance  contract  brings  practical 
management difficulties to set (changes of crop acreage from year to year for instance) and to 
set indemnities (high expertise costs due to quasi- systematic required expertise on the field). 
The insurance contract on farm revenue has been found more efficient with respect to cost 
than three other tools of asymmetric risk management, the wheat price option, the wheat crop 
insurance and the wheat sales insurance
2. 
 
3.1. The precautionary saving provision analysis 
 
The provision is a smoothing mechanism. When the farm income is high, the farmer is 
allowed to save free of fiscal and social taxes a percentage of its sales. This saving is invested 
in low-risk bonds. When the farm income is low, the farmer is allowed to withdraw from the 
savings in order to increase the farm income. It is a very traditional and effective mean of 
managing agricultural business risk. The mechanism has been implemented in many countries 
around  the  world  under  various  names  such  as  mutual  funds  in  English  or  caisse  de 
stabilisation in French. International agreements on products in the seventies and even more 
recent counter-cyclical measures and subsidies are part of the same story. 
                                                 
2 This research result is presented in a working paper n°XXX UMR SMART (2007) and submitted for 
publication in Economie & Sociétés, Spring 2008 issue    8 
  Most of these applied mechanisms failed due to practical and political issues. First, it is 
difficult to define economically what is a high farm price (or income) and what is a low farm 
price. To elicit the pivot level for smoothing price or income is not trivial. Second, any pivot 
price based upon cost consideration is subject to strong political pressure. Very quickly, risk 
management and price (or income) support are mixed with negative consequences. 
  To overcome the difficulties and keep advantage of the basic smoothing mechanism, two 
types of pivot have been tested. The first type of pivot is an historical moving average of farm 
sales. It has been chose a three-year moving average and an exponential smoothing, which is 
an improved moving average technique
3. The second type of pivot is the Value at Risk with a 
high percentage. For instance a Var(40<X<50%) is close and lower than the expected long 
term mean of a stochastic variable. 
  Using the pivot as defined previously, the amount of saving is a percentage k of the total 
sales and the withdrawal is 100% of the “loss” below the pivot 
 
-  the moving average pivot value 
 
The smoothing impact is mainly due to the maximum amount allowed of the precautionary 
saving provision. This maximum value is compute das a percentage of the pivot value of total 
sales. Other parameters have been checked such as the percentage of saving allowed per year 
or various asymmetric tunnels around the pivot value. 
 
The coefficient of variation decrease is proportional to the amount of the total saving allowed 
as presented in table 8. 
 
Table 8: Reduction of CV in relation with percentage of savings     
% of savings on 
pivot value 
Reduction in coefficient 
of variation 
10 %  8 to 10 % 
20 %  19 to 21 % 
30 %  30 to 34 % 
 
As  expected,  the  smoothing  approach  keeps  a  symmetric  distribution  of  farm  margin 
(skewness = 0,02 and kurtosis = 3,0) whatever the maximum level of the saving provision.  
 
The simulation performed develops price series without autocorrelation, which is far from real 
world  price  time-series.  Therefore,  a  moving  average  process  (MM3)  has  been  used  to 
develop autocorrelation within simulated price series. In doing so, it is observed a restricted 
effect of the precautionary saving provision. The provisions performs as an additional order of 
the moving average process. As a consequence, another pivot value is necessary, not a relative 
value but a fixed one. Different values at Risk of the farm sales were then used.   
 
-  the VaR pivot value 
 
Figure 3 presents an original set of thirty farm margin values derived from random drawn 
market prices by @RISK as well as a set of margins computed from MA(3) derived prices. 
                                                 
3 Calculus of the exponential smoothing pivot of Farm Total Sales (TS) with β coefficient: 
   TSt+1 = (TSt + β. TSt-1 + β
2. TSt-2 + β
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This second set of margins is supposed to reflect better a real agricultural market environment 
(with single farm payments). 
 
Figure 3: Sample of original and autocorrelated grain farm income series 



























The  mechanism  of  the  precautionary  saving  provision  is  applied  to  the  autocorrelated 
series. Three parameters have been checked in order to analyze the impact of the provision on 
the farm margin: 
 
-  the pivot level on a VaR 10 to 40% range 
 The VaR 10 % is allowing to save very quickly and to withdraw barely. A VaR above 50 % 
does not show any evidence of savings as withdrawals are too frequent,  
- the rate of savings into the provision on a range from 20 to 100 % and rate of withdrawal 
of 100 %, 
- the maximum level of savings on a range from 10 to 50% on farm total sales.  
 
The main results of the precautionary saving provision (open market with SFP scenario), 
as presented in Table 9, are close to expected direct implications of smoothing a stationary 
series. Even though, it is noticed a significant change in the mean value of the farm margin 
with respect to the VaR value. This is related to the final value of the provision. For a low 
value  at  risk,  for  instance  VaR10%,  the  savings  allowed  is  saturated  rather  quickly  and 
withdrawals are rare. The saving is maximal at the end of the simulated scenario. When the 
saving value is added (on average) to the farm margin mean, the initial value of the farm 
margin is reached.    
 
Table 9: Main results of the precautionary saving provision (open market with SFP) 
  Mean  Coeff  of Variation  Value at Risk 5 % 
Original margin  57,663  -   0.59  -  4,300  - 
VaR 10%  k=0,5  50,405  - 12 %  0.41  - 30 %  4,558  + 6 % 
VaR 10% k=0,25  53,847  - 7 %  0.49  - 17 %  4,515  + 5 % 
VaR 20%  k=0,5  53,331  - 7 %  0.36  - 39 %  5,175  + 15 % 
VaR 20% k=0,25  55,497  - 3 %  0.47  - 21 %  4,730  + 10 % 
VaR 30%  k=0,5  55,341  - 3 %  0.33  - 44 %  5,203  + 21 % 
VaR 30% k=0,25  56,497  - 2 %  0.46  - 21 %  4,859  + 13 % 
VaR 40%  k=0,5  57,381  0 %  0.31  - 48 %  5,676  + 32 %   10 
VaR 40% k=0,25  57,522  0 %  0.44  - 26 %  4,988  + 16 % 
 
  It is also noticed as expected a decrease of the coefficient of variation values when the 
pivot value is increased. For instance, the coefficient of variation is reduced from 0.59 to 0.31 
from original value to a provision mechanism with a Var40% pivot and a 50% rate of savings 
(and a maximum of savings 50% of sales). The VaR of the farm margin distribution is then 
improved from 4,300 euros to a maximum value of 5,676 euros, a 32% increase. 
 
  Sensitivity results were checked in the third dimension, the maximum amount of savings. 
Basically,  the  smoothing  performance  is  weak  for  low  values  of  the  pivot,  whatever  the 
maximum amount of savings allowed. Basically, the impact of the saving amount is limited to 
a year after year accumulation of savings. To the opposite, with high values of the pivot – 
such as VaR 40%, the smoothing performance is much improved. The CV level of 0.31 is 
reached as soon as the level of savings is equal or above 30 %. Savings and withdrawals are 
well balanced and the smoothing performance is maximized. 
 
Table 10: Sensitivity of maximum saving percentage (open market with SFP) 
Savings in % of total 
sales (k = 0.5) 
CV  VaR 5% 
10 %  0.45  4,520 
20 %  0.39  4,760 
30 %  0.31  5,610 
40 %  0.31  5,690 
50 %  0.31  5.760 
 
Using @RISK Optimizer (Palisade 2006), it has been checked grain farm optima values 
for the three parameters (VaR, percentage of savings and maximum value of savings) for 
different market scenarios.  
Scenario  1  “minimum  of  farm  risk”:  high  price-yield  correlations  with  single  farm 
payment. The optimal parameters are the following. First, the CV is minimized in increasing 
the  VAR  up  to  50%.  As  the  VaR  50%  from  sales  is  estimated  from  price  and  yield 
distributions, the VaR is then fixed to 40% of the sales distribution. Second, upon a VaR 40% 
pivot, the CV is asymptotically minimized with a 50% saving rate and 100% withdrawal from 
the pivot rate. And third, under the previous settings, the CV is minimized with a maximum 
saving of 20% of total sales.   
  Scenario  2  “maximum  of  farm  risk”:  low  price-yield  correlations  without  single  farm 
payment, but equivalent high prices. The optimal parameters are the following. First the CV is 
minimized in increasing the VaR up to 50% as previously. It is then fixed at a 40% level. 
Second, upon a VaR 40% pivot, the CV is asymptotically minimized with a 80 % saving rate 
and  100%  withdrawal  from  the  pivot  rate.  Third,  under  the  previous  settings,  the  CV  is 
minimized with a maximum saving of 50% of the total sales. 
  
 
3.2.The compared performance of asymmetric risk management tools 
 
Four asymmetric risk management tools have been studied, a put option on wheat price, a 
crop yield insurance on wheat, a revenue insurance on wheat and a farm revenue insurance. 
Their relative performance has been compared at an equal cost. 
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3.2.1.  the asymmetric risk management tools 
 
(i) the put option on wheat price 
 
Conceptually, the final value (FV) of the option per hectare is set as: 
  
FV = Si.rh,i.max[δi.F0,i(1) – F1,i(1), 0] 
 
with      Si  the acreage  
rt,i  the current yield per crop 
δi   the hedge ratio (delta) per crop 
F0,i(1) the post crop November future price of wheat at planting period 
F1,i(1) the post crop November future prices of wheat at crop period 
 
(ii) the crop yield insurance on wheat 
 
  The insurance contract is described through its indemnity function. The indemnity 
function (IND) of the crop insurance contract is set as the following: 
 
IND = Si . max [λi.rh,i - rt,i, 0]. F0(1) 
   
with  rh,i  the historical yield per crop 
rt,i  the current yield per crop 
λi the deductible rate of the contract per crop 
 
Using the indemnity function, the pure premium value
4 of the contract is computed using a 
two stage Monte Carlo simulation. First the average cash-flow of the indemnity function is 
computed after 5.000 simulations. Then it is checked that an insurance constraint is fulfilled, 
such as the probability of indemnity payment (for instance, a maximum of 20 % of chance of 
payment, or one payment maximum every five years). This constraint is setting the minimum 
deductible rate of the insurance contract. If the constraint is fulfilled, the pure premium value 
is computed as the present value of the average cash-flow of the indemnity. 
 
(iii) the revenue insurance per crop (wheat) 
 
Indemnity is paid if the computed revenue at crop time is below a guaranteed level of 
revenue fixed per crop at the planting period. The indemnity function (IND) of the revenue 
insurance per crop is set as the following: 
 
IND = max Si.[λi.F0,i(1).rh,i -  F1,i(1).rt,i, 0] 
 
with  λi the deductible rate of the contract per crop 
 
(iv) the farm revenue insurance 
 
Indemnity is paid if the computed farm revenue at crop time is below a guaranteed level of 
revenue fixed at the planting period. The indemnity function is the following: 
  
                                                 
4 The pure premium value should be increased by the value of insurance costs and competitive margin for 
finding the market value of risk.    12 
IND = Max [λ .Σ (F0,i(1).rh,i .Si)- Σ (F1,i(1).r0,i .Si)  ,  0] 
 
with  λ  the deductible level on total farm sales 
 
 
3.2.2. The compared performance 
 
The performance of the tools (at equal pure premium cost) has been checked with respect to 
the coefficient of variation and VaR 5%. Table 11 presents the main findings for the scenario 
with high price-yield correlation and with single farm payment. 
  





























































































  The whole farm revenue insurance may then be considered as the most efficient tool. The 
deductible rate has then set at 13% for a 20 % of chance of indemnity payment to the farmer. 
Upon this constraint, the pure premium value of the insurance contract is estimated at about 
100 € per hectare. This value is decreasing of course with the deductible rate. For instance, a 
30% deductible rate brings the insurance premium to 35 € per hectare, which is a very low 
insurance premium. In other words, the probability for a farm to have a 30% loss in sales, 
which is the WTO rule for allowing public subsidies in the green box, is very low. The impact 
of the insurance contract on farm margin is illustrated in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Distribution of farm margin with gross sales insurance   13 
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2.3. Risk management between normal farm business risk and climatic/market shocks 
 
Basically, the study performed on individual tools indicates that the major benefit of the 
symmetric management tool is the CV reduction when the major benefit of the asymmetric 
management tool is the VaR improvement. Therefore, optimization of use of the two types of 
tool  cannot  be  a  maximization  (or  minimization)  of  any  parameter.  The  issue  is  more  a 
feasible combined set of tools at a cost that the farmer is willing to pay, as illustrated in Figure 
5 (Cordier 2004). 
 
  Figure 5: Mapping of the farm risk management tools  
Error! Objects cannot be created from editing field codes. 
The farm income risk management is simulated by (i) a precautionary saving provision 
and (ii) an insurance contract on total farm revenue. The method used is first applying the 
insurance contract in order to derive a series of farm margin, then smoothing the margin series 
on a VaR 40% pivot. 
Based upon the stochastic farm margin model and optimal symmetric risk management 
using a precautionary saving provision as presented above, the study is looking at an optimal 
value of the insurance deductible rate. 
 Simulation has been performed under two extreme scenarios: the low risk scenario with 
high price-yield correlation and with single farm payment and the high risk scenario with low 
price-yield correlation and without single farm payment. Three deductible rates have been 
tested: 10, 20 and 30 %. The results are presented in table 12. 
 
Table 12: Impact of combined tools (precautionary saving and farm revenue insurance) 
Low risk scenario  High risk scenario  Deductible rate 
CV  VaR 5%  CV  VaR 5% 
10 %  0.18  49,347  0.31  12,520 
20 %  0.21  37,281  0.44  7,872 
30 %  0.34  18,633  0.84  -1,776 
 
  This type of results should be chosen by farmers with respect to the premium value of the 
insurance. The improvements in CV and VaR are not linear with respect to deductible rate. As 
the  insurance  premium  is  increasing  when  decreasing  the  deductible,  an  optimal  level  of 
deductible can be found with respect to individual risk aversion.     




Farm risk management is a rising issue of the Common Agricultural Policy. The 2003 
CAP reform started to leave European farmers more directly exposed to market risk while 
climatic and sanitary risks are also rising. Futures and options contracts, insurance contracts, 
mutual funds and precautionary savings are now considered for farm income stabilisation in a 
global risk market. In addition, safety nets are asked by producers for crisis management.  
The pros and cons of risk management tools are now well documented. The simulation of 
a stochastic farm income gives the opportunity to estimate farm risk within different scenarios 
of market environment. Basically, the price-yield correlation matrix between various crops 
has  a  significant  impact  on  the  farm  risk  level:  about  +  25-30%  increase  in  the  income 
coefficient of variation  between  a closed and open market environment. Furthermore, the 
single farm payment (SFP) as given to a grain farm in France in 2006-07 is also stabilizing 
farmer income. A 40-45% increase in the income coefficient of variation is expected if the 
single farm payment is suppressed.    
The impact of a precautionary saving provision has been studied. A fixed pivot in relation 
with a high VaR value (40%) is more efficient than a moving average pivot (or exponential 
smoothing pivot). The performance analysis of asymmetric risk management tools was also 
studied. The analysis performed on four basic tools, price option, crop insurance, revenue 
insurance per crop and whole farm, is concluding in favour of the farm revenue insurance to 
improve the farm income value at risk. The theoretical diversification effect within the farm 
revenue  improves  the  efficiency  of  this  contract  as  compared  with  insurance  contract  on 
unitary risk. This contract should be targeted by public policy, in between any safety nets and 
fiscal  measures  in  favor  of  precautionary  savings  (or  mutual  funds),  whatever  SFP  are 
maintained or not. 
This best performance of the farm revenue insurance is based upon pure premium. The 
capacity of the insurer to take advantage of the crop diversification effect should be studied as 
well as the related management costs.  
Optimal  coordination  between  savings  for  managing  normal  farm  business  risk  and 
insurance against shocks has been checked practically. Sets of parameters have been found 
with respect to market environment and related risk. Additional work is required however for 
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